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COURTROOM BIAS: GENDER DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST PREGNANT LITIGATORS
"We need to recognize difference among women as diversity rather
than division, and difference between women and men as opportunity
rather than danger."' With a mass of literature and scholarly writing
on topics ranging from gender discrimination to affirmative action,
the single fact remains throughout all legal thought that men and
women are "different." Although this statement seems simplistic in
its characterization of the sexes, it raises questions and issues that
are yet to be answered. One of the most obvious areas of life where
the differences between men and women shine through is pregnancy.
Whatever advances women make in society to become equal in the
workplace, the fact will always remain that women become pregnant,
and as such must deal with the joys and problems arising from it.
This Note will focus on whether this basic biological fact leads to the
ultimate conclusion that women will necessarily face gender
discrimination as long as there remains a physical difference between
men and women.
The first section of this Note will look at the history of pregnancy
discrimination. Before 1978 the courts did not view discrimination
against women due to pregnancy as gender discrimination under Title
VII.2 In 1978 Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
3
and cases after 1978 will be discussed to show the way courts have
interpreted the Act. The second part of this Note will focus on
discrimination in general against women in the legal profession.
There is evidence that gender bias does still exist in this area.
However, there is also an implication that the discrimination is not
as prevalent as previous years, and the manifestations - where they
still exist - are subtle. The third part of this Note will discuss an
area where the two sections merge: pregnant female litigators in the
courtroom. This section will look at specific instances of overt
discrimination against pregnant litigators and discuss how the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not address this issue. Finally,
this Note will give possible suggestions to remedy the continuing
discrimination in the courtroom.
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1. Catherine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1303
(1987) (citation omitted).
2. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976).
3. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994).
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PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
History of the Act
One of the first major Supreme Court cases to deal with the issue
of pregnancy and discrimination is General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.4
In this case female employees of General Electric were denied
disability benefits when they were absent from work as a result of
pregnancy.5 They sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6
arguing that the denial of benefits constituted gender discrimination
in violation of the Act.7 The district court found that the disability
plan was sex discrimination,8 and the appellate court affirmed.9
However, when the case reached the United States Supreme Court
it was reversed.' The Court said that the exclusion of pregnant
women was not gender-based discrimination because "it is impossible
to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in this scheme simply
because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not receive
benefits; that is to say, gender-based discrimination does not result
simply because an employer's disability-benefits plan is less than all-
inclusive."" The Court showed its reluctance to expand the meaning
of the Act through judicial intervention and said that "[wihen Congress
makes it unlawful for an employer to 'discriminate... because of...
sex. . .,' without further explanation of its meaning, we should not
readily infer that it meant something different from what the concept
of discrimination has traditionally meant."'
.Congress responded to the wording of the Gilbert decision in 1978
by creating the Pregnancy Discrimination Act as an amendment to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Later cases interpreted
this amendment as effectively overruling the Supreme Court's decision
in Gilbert.4 The Act prohibits an employer from discriminating
against an employee in any way on the basis of the individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. The clause relating to
pregnancy states that:
4. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
5. Id. at 127.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
7. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 130.
8. Id. (citing 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va 1974)).
9. Id. (citing 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975)):
10. Id. at 147.
11. Id. at 138-39.
12. Id. at 145.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e).
14. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 670 (1983).
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[tihe terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes.15
Although the amendment was a step toward equality for women in
employment, some legal scholars argue that the method Congress
chose does not fully appreciate the physical difference between men
and women.
Legal equality analysis "runs out" when it encounters "real"
difference, and only becomes available if and when the difference
is analogized to some experience men can have too. Legislative
overruling of Gilbert by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was
thus accomplished by making pregnancy look similar to something
men experienced as well - disability.1
Later cases have used the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to flush
out congressional intent. 7 One of the Supreme Court's first inter-
pretations of the Act came in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.18 The employer in
this case amended its health insurance policy to conform to the new
Act. 9 It extended coverage to pregnancy-related conditions to the
same extent as any other medical condition.' The coverage also
extended to spouses of male employees, but not to the same extent
for female employees.2' The male employees in Newport News
Shipbuilding sued the employer based on the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act arguing that the employer was discriminating against them
based on their sex. In interpreting the Act the Supreme Court agreed
with the male employees and found the employer's policy violated
the Act "because the protection it affords to married male employees
is less comprehensive than the protection it affords to married female
employees."22 The use of the Act to protect male employees in this
way tends to support Christine Littleton's characterization of the Act
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k) (1994).
16. Littleton, supra note 1, at 1306.
17. See Newport News Shipbuilding, 462 U.S. at 669; Aerospace & Agric. Implement
Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
18. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
19. Id. at 670.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 676.
157
158 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 8:155
as disability-focused rather than pregnancy-focused.' The male
employees in Newport News Shipbuilding were not going to become
pregnant, so their use of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was based
on a claim of mistreatment due to gender.' This is a disability-focused
argument and does not relate to the pregnancy aspects of the Act.
A final interpretation of the Act comes from the Supreme Court
case of International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace &
Agricultural Implement Workers ofAmerica, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc.' In this case the employer implemented a policy that excluded
all female workers from working in areas of the plant that would
expose them to lead.26 Occupational exposure to lead, for a pregnant
woman,, could lead to a risk of harm to the fetus." The female
employees filed a class action suit based on the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act arguing that the policy was discrimination based on sex.'
The Court agreed with the employees and said that"[r espondent has
chosen to treat all its female employees as potentially pregnant; that
choice evinces discrimination on the basis of sex."29 The Court
elaborated on its decision and said that "women as capable of doing
their jobs as their male counterparts may not be forced to choose
between having a child and having ajob."' The decision dealt directly
with the physical difference between men and women and prohibited
discrimination against women based on the fact that they are capable
of becoming pregnant, unless that fact prevents the particular woman
from performing her job duties.3 '
Limitations of the Act
Although the Pregnancy Discrimination Act has helped to
alleviate the adverse employment effects that a pregnancy can have
for a woman, the reach of the legislation's protection is not boundless.
For example, in Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc.,32 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a woman's pregnancy
discrimination claim may be barred by a state statute of limitations. 33
23. See Littleton, supra note 1, at 1306.
24. See Newport News Shipbuilding, 462 U.S. at 669.
25. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
26. Id. at 191.
27. Id. at 190.
28. Id. at 192.
29. Id. at 199.
30. Id. at 204.
31. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 207 (declaring that Johnson Controls was excluding
women because of their reproductive capacity).
32. 236 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2001).
33. Id. at 372.
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In Illinois a plaintiff must file a discrimination charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 300 days after
the unlawful employment practice.3 4 The plaintiff in this case waited
two years and consequently had her claim barred.' Although
equitable estoppel, equitable tolling, and continuation of the violation
could extend the statutory period, the court held they were not
applicable in this case. 6
The case Barnett v. Nevada37 illustrates a second limitation. In
Barnett the plaintiffs action was barred because she did not first
exhaust all possible administrative remedies before filing suit in
federal court.' Barnett worked as a corrections officer for the Nevada
Department of Prisons and claimed she was denied reasonable
accommodation when she became pregnant. 9 The plaintiff filed a
complaint with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission (NERC), but
did not fill out all the appropriate requests, and did not file a separate
complaint with the EEOC.' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that "[b]ecause Barnett's failure to cooperate with the
NERC's investigation caused the administrative action to be closed
without any action having been taken by the NERC, she failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies."41
The case of Miller v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.42
demonstrates two limitations on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.43
The plaintiff, Mrs. Miller, filed discrimination charges after she
discovered she was the lowest paid employee in her office, among all
her co-workers who had never been pregnant." First, although
seemingly obvious, the case states that an employer must have actual
knowledge of the pregnancy for a plaintiff to successfully charge
discrimination.' The court opinion stated"[hier claim of pregnancy
discrimination with respect to her April 1996 raise cannot be based
on her being pregnant if [employer] King did not know she was."'
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3169 (2001).
38. Id. at *4.
39. Id. at *2.
40. Id.
41. Id. at *6.
42. 203 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 2000).
43. See id. at 1006 (discussing limitations of knowledge and adverse action).
44. Id. at 1001.
45. Id. at 1006.
46. Id.
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The second limitation that can be extracted from the Miller case
is that the action taken against the plaintiff must be adverse."' In
this case, a raise that the plaintiff received was actually larger than
her non-pregnant co-workers and the court said that this fact was
"fatal to Miller's claim, for without a materially adverse job action,
discrimination is not actionable.""
GENDER DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
Gender Discrimination Still Exists
Several task forces around the country have been assigned over
the years to survey and report on the level of discrimination in the
current workforce, particularly in the legal area. 9 Few scholars would
disagree that when women entered the legal profession the previously
male-dominated profession responded with a certain amount of malice
and discrimination.' Women, however, are increasingly making their
mark,"' and it is therefore necessary to first determine if gender
discrimination is even present in the year 2001.
In 1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit created
a task force to explore the issue of gender discrimination and survey
lawyers on the issue.52 The study looked at discrimination based on
gender and race and those conducting the study interviewed 238 white
male lawyers, 226 white female lawyers, ninety-five minority male
lawyers, and fifty-three minority female lawyers.' Women attorneys
reported the remnants of gender-based discrimination, and"roughly
half of the female lawyers reported experiencing biased conduct based
on gender."54 The report also suggested that working in the legal
profession brought on more discrimination for females than simply
participating in the system.55 Although some discrimination was
47. Id.
48. Miller, 203 F.3d at 1006.
49. See infra notes 51, 57, 90.
50. See Elizabeth A. Delfs, Foul Play in the Courtroom: Persistence, Cause and Remedies,
17 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 309, 311 (1996).
51. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Scripting Reality in the Legal Workplace: Women Lawyers,
Litigation Prevention Measures, and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 6 CoLUM. J. GEN.
& L. 323, 331 (1996) (discussing survey results of the Second Circuit task force).
52. Sharon E. Grubin & John M. Walker, Jr., Report of the Second Circuit Task Force on
Gender, Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 11 (1997)
(reporting conclusions of the Second Circuit task force).
53. Id. at 11.
54. Id. at 42
55. Id. at 51.
20011 GENDER DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PREGNANT LITIGATORS
reported against parties and witnesses, "[bliased conduct toward
lawyers, based on gender or race or ethnicity, has occurred to a greater
degree."'
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals also conducted a task force
investigation in 1996."7 This report showed that gender discrimination
is also present in the D.C. Circuit.' However, some of the reports
here showed discrimination in a subtle form. For instance, "[uin focus
group discussions, women attorneys commented that they were more
likely to be interrupted or ignored by judges or by other attorneys
than were their male counterparts."59 This is not blatant discrimina-
tion that would violate Title VII, ° but it is still felt by women. Other
observations come from judges who say that "some of their colleagues
'do not respond' to women attorneys in the same way as they do males,
or may express irritation at, or hold women attorneys to a higher
standard than men."61
The subtle types of discrimination in the D.C. Circuit also extend
to the work assignments that women receive. For example, "[wiomen
responding to the Attorney Survey reported that their assignments
are affected for reasons associated with gender more often than did
their male colleagues."62 The study cited one woman saying of her
firm's assigning policies, "I know that when someone is staffing up
for an emergency case, they don't want a woman with young children.
They assume that these women can't give the time."" A Massachu-
setts task force went so far as to say that "from their entrance into
the courthouse and throughout their participation in the business
of the courts, female ... attorneys are faced with unnecessary and
unacceptable obstacles that can be explained only in terms of their
gender.""
In her article, Elizabeth A. Delfs relates the history of women
in the legal profession as well as her personal experiences.' Delfs
is an attorney in private practice and summarizes her thoughts on
women in the law field by saying, "I've been practicing law for twenty
years and I still can't believe the level, of garbage that women
56. Id.
57. Special Section: Report of the Special Committee on Gender to the D.C. Circuit Task
Force on Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias, 84 GEO. L.J. 1657 (1996) [hereinafter D.C. Circuit
Report].
58. Id. at 1709-11, 1734-36.
59. Id. at 1709.
60. See Civil Rights Act, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 703(a) (1964).
61. D.C. Circuit Report, supra note 57, at 1711-12.
62. Id. at 1735.
63. Id. at 1736.
64. Delfs, supra note 50, at 309.
65. See id.
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attorneys have to put up with." She notes that women have been
dealing with discrimination in the courtroom since they entered the
field in the 1960s and'70s.67 The discrimination does not come solely
from the bench either. "Stereotypes about women may be, used as
a trial tactic to silence a female attorney. In one instance, a male
attorney demanded that his female opponent not interrupt him any
further, stating that 'women attorneys have a hard time keeping their
mouths shut.'"' Comments like this place women attorneys in the
awkward position of choosing to zealously represent their client,
thereby playing into the stereotype with which they are faced, or to
stand back to avoid fitting into that female category even if that choice
may injure the client. Men deal with female opposing counsel in
different ways and "some male attorneys believe it is fair play to
actively undermine a woman attorney's case by using her gender." 9
These types of discrimination apparently are still present in the legal
workforce and are not addressed by Title V11 70 nor the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.7'
Gender Discrimination, Where it Still Exists, is Subtle
Although the above sections show that women in certain areas
do still feel the bite of prejudice based on their sex, that feeling is not
unanimous.72 In fact, other studies show that some women who
acknowledge the presence of discrimination argue that it is waning.7
Women in the legal profession are no longer significantly outnumbered
by their male counterparts, as they were when they first entered the
field.74 This trend extends out into the private sector as well and
"[w]omen's battle for access to the elite enclaves of the profession -
large law firms - has been won."75
The Second Circuit survey cited above76 also contains indications
that existing discrimination is slowly being eliminated. 7 There is
a trend toward increased participation by females in the judicial
66. Id.
67. Id. at 311.
68. Id. at 314.
69. Id. at 315.
70. Civil Rights Act, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 703(a) (1964).
71. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1978).
72. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 51, at 331; infra note 90 and accompanying text.
73. Bisom-Rapp, supra note 51, at 331.
74. See D.C. Circuit Report, supra note 57, at 1686.
75. Bisom-Rapp, supra note 51, at 331.
76. See supra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
77. See generally Grubin & Walker, supra note 52.
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system.v8 "The significant representation of women and minorities
on some of the courts of the Second Circuit is a relatively recent,
phenomenon."79 Although the study as cited earlier states that women
do still feel the effects of their gender, the study also says that "an
overall majority of lawyers - regardless of gender, race or ethnicity
- reported that they had not experienced biased conduct personally."s
The results from the D.C. Circuit task force ran along similar
lines. There was evidence that the feeling of discrimination existed,
but it too appeared to be waning. Statistically, more females are
entering the legal area."1 "In 1970, only 3-5% of the attorneys in this
country were women. Today, women constitute close to one-fourth
of the attorneys in the nation. Twenty years ago law school classes
were about 15% female. Today, they are 43% female." 2
Again, the D.C. Circuit echoes the idea that the areas where
women still feel bias cannot be reached by the arms of the protective
legislation.' Outright discrimination that is covered under Title VII
is now missing from most workplaces, and both genders in the D.C.
survey agree that "the more overt forms of gender-biased behavior
are, with only a few exceptions, absent from proceedings before the
courts of the D.C. Circuit."8" Mainly, discrimination manifests itself
in more subtle ways, and "[t]hese more subtle forms of difference in
treatment relate to how they [women] were addressed, whether they
were interrupted or listened to, and whether they were recognized
as attorneys. These behaviors can undermine, albeit in subtle ways,
perceptions as serious professionals and hence their effectiveness."'
These subtle practices, however, can have serious effects on a woman's
ability to do her job. A large part of success in the legal profession
is based on reputation and the foundation of confidence that an
attorney has established. Women in the profession will have an uphill
battle to stay on the same level with men if they start out being
treated differently, even in these subtle ways.
There is some indication that in certain parts of the country
discrimination is completely eliminated.' For instance, attorneys
had no complaints in the D.C. Circuit regarding the way they were
78. Id.
79. Id. at 29.
80. Id. at 42.
81. D.C. Circuit Report, supra note 57, at 1677.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1707.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1708.
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treated by judges.87 The study stated that "blatant gender bias by
judges toward attorneys is virtually nonexistent in the courts of the
D.C. Circuit."' Although this study does not address the issue of
subtle discrimination, it does illustrate that overt gender discrimina-
tion in the legal professional is no longer a significant problem in some
jurisdictions.89
An Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals task force study came to a
similar conclusion.' In this area, the survey concluded that "[tihe
results ... indicated that 'overall, females are treated fairly and
equally in every aspect of judicial conduct."91
The evidence as a whole suggests that gender discrimination in
the legal profession, and particularly against female litigators, does
still exist. However, that discrimination appears in subtle forms
which, although still damaging, is most likely beyond the protections
given by statute. The next section of this Note determines if there
is an area of discrimination that is blatant, and therefore could be
solved statutorily.
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FEMALE LITIGATORS
Males in the legal profession are most obviously faced with a
woman's gender differences when she is showing her pregnancy.
There is evidence that pregnant female litigators still feel outright
discrimination when they are arguing in a courtroom and showing
their condition.92 Consider the following reports from women
attorneys:
One woman reports she was told during trial, "So I see you got
yourself knocked up."93 Another relates being told, 'What do you think
this is lady - a delivery room?"9' A female prosecutor says a judge
said to her "Ms. X, I think you are too pregnant to prosecute."95
Further, as if those comments do not go far enough, imagine being
told by ajudge in a courtroom, "My, your breasts have gotten big from
nursing, haven't they!"9 Worse still, imagine one woman's situation
87. D.C. Circuit Report, supra note 57, at 1708.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Rena M. Atchison, Survey: A Comparison of Gender Bias Studies: Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals and South Dakota Findings in the Context of Nationwide Studies, 43 S.D. L. REV.
616, 620(1998).
91. Id.
92. Delfs, supra note 50, at 317.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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where the judge told her, "If your husband had kept his hands to
himself you wouldn't be in the condition you are in."7 The judge that,
made the last comment was publicly reprimanded by the court in a
later decision. 8 One woman relates a story from her pregnancy that
shows a woman can be left with no option from a judge - she will
be criticized whether she continues to work through her pregnancy
or chooses to stay home.
This tactic can take the form of overly stringent requirements.
A Connecticut attorney was given only a week after the birth of
her baby to begin a case. After much argument and castigation,
she was given three weeks. When she appeared three weeks after
the birth of her child, she was admonished for coming to work so
soon after giving birth. Thejudgefurtherremarked: 'youyuppies
want only money.' In California, a judge refused to grant
continuances, even when the attorney was about to deliver her
child.99
These comments show that the subtle forms of bias can disappear
when judges are faced with a woman's pregnancy rather than just
her gender and can be replaced with overt discrimination. Other
examples support this theory. For instance, a newspaper article
related a story from former First Lady and current New York Senator
Hillary Rodham Clinton."° She stated that her pregnancy caused
her male colleagues and judges to become uncomfortable. Clinton
said, "A judge looked me straight in the eye and said, 'Hillary,'...
'you just can't have this baby in this courtroom.' I said, 'Judge, I'm
not planning on doing that.'"1 O' These stories articulate how males
in the profession react when they are confronted with the physical
difference between men and women.
Discrimination against women in general has waned as men have
become more accustomed to women sharing the role that men alone
have enjoyed. However, men will never be in the role of a pregnant
litigator, and "[plregnant attorneys do indeed make some of their male
97. Id.
98. See In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 657 (Wash. 1987). One scholar points out that the
decision did not sufficiently meet the offense in terms of reprimand. "However, the wording
of two judicial opinions provides a clue to the tolerant attitude of the judiciary towards
gender-biased behavior, blatant or otherwise. Judge Deming's outrageous acts of sexual
harassment were referred to in the opinion as a 'lack of social graces, restraint and decorum.'
Delfs, supra note 50, at 329.
99. Delfs, supra note 50, at 317 (citations omitted).
100. Alison Mitchell, Banking on Family Issues, Clinton Seeks Parent's Votes, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 1996, at A19.
101. Id.
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colleagues uneasy." 2 Society views the role of a mother and the role
of a professional separately; when the two views conflict women
attorneys are adversely affected.'0 3
To show this mind-set, another female attorney relates this story
from her experience at a law firm:
During my third year of legal practice, a single spoken sentence
led me to consider at length the position of women attorneys in
Wall Street law firms. Commenting on my recent announcement
that I was pregnant, a male partner assured me, "In this
department you will be treated as an attorney, not as a pregnant
woman." I puzzled over this dichotomy, wondering about the
choice the partner had imposed on himself. Although I was
pregnant and an attorney, he preferred not to see me as a pregnant
attorney.... My professional status was severed from my sex and
physical condition."0 '
The statement again brings to light the problem males have with
integrating the image they have of women and their capabilities with
how they view attorneys.1 5 As the attorney above stated, men can
separate the female as an attorney and the female as a woman who
may become pregnant and have children.1" Discrimination in this
area comes from men, and occasionally other women, who cannot
integrate the two versions of a woman into one functional being.
This passage also shows that it is possible for men to discriminate
against women based on pregnancy without feeling any actual malice
towards the woman. A discrimination offender's motives may be
benevolent - the person may sincerely be concerned about the
woman's health and the child's well-being; however, the effects on
the woman are the same whether or not the discrimination comes
with kind intentions. Therefore, to solve the problem the remedies
must be aimed at the actual forms of discrimination rather than the
underlying intentions.107
A final example from California shows the effect that this
discriminating has had on a woman's career. Susan Sergojan and
another former prosecutor, Laura Akers, were interviewed after they
filed suit against two San Diego district attorneys for discriminating
102. Bisom-Rapp, supra note 51, at 323 n.1.
103. Id. at 337.
104. Id. at 323-24.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. For a full discussion of possible remedies in the area, see infra notes 116-30 and
accompanying text.
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against them while they were pregnant. In the interview, Sergoj an
said that "she had long witnessed examples of discrimination against
women in the office, particularly when they became pregnant. She
said Miller [one of the district attorneys] would not allow her to handle
trials during her two previous pregnancies."' As a result of discri-
mination, women can be kept out of the courtroom or given lesser
assignments, which could dampen their career movement in ways
not experienced by men. "0 If women are given the less appealing or
challenging cases to deal with while they are pregnant, they are at
a strategic disadvantage in terms of job advancement because men
will not be faced with this obstacle. Again, this is true despite the
possibility that women were being denied job opportunities because
of genuine concern over their health.
Fortunately, this type of pregnancy discrimination can be met
by legislation. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act forbids an employer
to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.""' This means
that if women can show that they were kept out of the courtroom or
passed over for better assignments because of their pregnancy they
will have a successful suit under the Act. The Act also eliminates
the employer's ability to "limit, segregate, or classify his employees
or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive an individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, or national origin.""' The difficulty here is
proving a prima facie case that the employment decision was based
on the pregnancy. The employer has the right to rebut that prima
facie case with evidence that the adverse action was the result of
another legitimate business reason."' The employer will then be
successful on the case unless the female employee can show that the
legitimate business interest is mere pretext."14 This is very difficult
to prove. And even beyond these actions, the Act will not stop the
108. Ann Krueger, Ex-Prosecutors Sue DA, Claim Discrimination, Pair Say Rights Were
Violated While Pregnant, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 2, 1999, at B1.
109. Id.
110. D.C. Circuit Report, supra note 57, at 1735.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aX1) (1994).
112. Id. § 2000e-2(aX2).
113. See generally Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
499 U.S. 187 (1991) (discussing the procedure for establishing a gender discrimination suit
under the Civil Rights Act).
114. Id.
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comments in court from judges and male attorneys since this does
not constitute an employment action by an employer.11 5 The next
section will look at what remedies are available to avoid these
problems.
PROPOSED REMEDIES OF PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
The first possibility to more broadly lessen the existence of
pregnancy discrimination specifically and gender discrimination
generally is to institute a proper review system of legal places of
employment. Although this policy would have little effect on the
conduct ofjudges, it would have an impact on firms and the treatment
of female litigators in the private sector. The firms should "implement
and administer a carefully written performance review system for
the lawyers they employ. These evaluations should then be
scrutinized for evidence of stereotyping or bias.""' A review system
will help firms stay aware of the problems they are facing concerning
discrimination so they can formulate responses before the discrimina-
tion adversely affects female employment. The system would help
ensure that assignments are given to female litigators without
discrimination. A solid system also increases stability because
"[s]ystematizing the evaluation of employees enhances the appearance
of rationality in the decision-making process. Scrutinizing reviews
for stereotypical comments, and then altering them through expansion
and clarification when such comments are found, produces documents
which demonstrate that the evaluation was based upon neutral
criteria."" ' Such reviews would also allow companies and firms to
set out appropriate guidelines in the area based on what current
practices are in comparison to acceptable practices. It is necessary,
for this suggestion to have effect, that an unbiased party compiles
the information."' Attorneys may feel more comfortable being honest
during such reviews if they know the information will not lead to any
reprisals from their job.
A second suggestion is for jurisdictions to create and publish task
force findings. The majority of the statistical data from this Note was
gathered from the results of task force findings, as they are an
excellent way to stay aware of the problems in particular
jurisdictions."9 Participants in judicial proceedings will be better
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1978).
116. Bisom-Rapp, supra note 51, at 344.
117. Id. at 345.
118. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text
119. See supra notes 51-52, 57, 90.
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able to address and eliminate courtroom discrimination if they are
in tune with the specific offenses that are present in their area. The
surveys should include topics such as overt and subtle discrimination
and comments from judges, treatment regarding gender from opposing
counsel, and the job opportunities and chances for advancement that
are available based on gender in the public and private legal
employment areas. Studies should be conducted on gender fairness
and then made available to all players in the system: judges,
attorneys, and non-judicial court staff. 120
An effective way to ensure that the discrimination problem is
not ignored is for female attorneys to file formal complaints. Most
states offer an opportunity for lawyers to file formal complaints
against judges. 21 This option is an efficient way to bring attention
to particularjudges who consistently discriminate in their courtrooms,
as well as to identify geographic areas that are inept at dealing with
the problem. When an attorney files a formal complaint against a
judge, the process begins with the state judicial conduct group, and
these "organizations exist in the majority of states and are charged
with the responsibility of ensuring that judges maintain the standards
of professional conduct. " 122
One necessary aspect of the complaint procedure is assurance
of confidentiality. Women attorneys who litigate may be afraid to
report practices by judges whom they will argue in front of again, and
may therefore not file reports if they are afraid of reprisal.' An
unbiased ethical state organization is the key to this requirement
and women must be able to lodge anonymous complaints without
worrying that their identity will be discovered.
Another option to eliminate discrimination is to start educating
law students. Law schools report the existence of gender bias in
growing numbers.' It makes sense that this would be an appropriate
forum to begin discussion on the issues of discrimination and to
propose measures to stop it. Curricula should include classes and
discussions that explore the dangers of discrimination and the harms
it causes for women. Law schools should allow students to question
and study the area, as well as taking"a firm and public stand against
gender bias within their own backyard."' Training at the law school
level should include the notion that good intentions may still have
120. Grubin & Walker, supra note 52, at 104.
121. Delfs, supra note 50, at 328-29.
122. Id. at 327-28.
123. Id. at 330.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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negative consequences. Students must understand that they need
not intend to discriminate against a woman for her career to be
adversely affected. Law schools must ensure that there is no gender
discrimination, particularly against pregnant students, in admissions
or treatment during classes and activities.
Gender bias is currently not recognized as prohibited behavior
by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 126 This fact could
not only discourage women from reporting discrimination behavior,
but could also make them feel such behavior is acceptable. If the
judiciary has not chosen to denounce such activity a woman may feel
as if she is complaining about nothing. This can be a strong
disincentive if a woman is already feeling the effects of discrimination.
Judiciaries have the option of adopting a canon that would forbid such
discrimination as part of the expected ethical conduct in that
particular jurisdiction.127 Such an adoption would inform attorneys
in that area that discrimination is not an appropriate form of
courtroom behavior. This suggestion ties in with the formal complaint
procedure suggestion in that such complaints are made more difficult
if a jurisdiction has not announced a policy against discrimination.
Another approach would be to focus on the development and
creation of judges as well as the creation of lawyers. Training for
judges would occur separately from law school and would follow
separate standards than those set out for practicing attorneys. The
training should come in two forms. First,judges should be instructed
on how to deal with discrimination between attorneys. Ifjudges have
adequate control over the courtroom atmosphere then a great deal
of discrimination from opposing counsel against a female litigator
will be reduced. Second, judges should be informed of the direct and
subtle occurrences of discrimination in their jurisdiction, and
instructed on ways to avoid similar behavior. This approach would
tie in to the suggestion of regular creation and publication of task force
surveys. Judges should be encouraged to take the initiative and
correct any person present in the courthouse when she/he engages
in gender-biased conduct.' Judges could further be informed of which
private activities tend to foster discrimination, and some argue that
"membership by judges in private clubs which discriminate on the
basis of race, sex or national origin [should be] discouraged."129 This
would help eliminate the possibility that judges would set an example
of discrimination unintentionally through their private activities.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Atchinson, supra note 90, at 628.
129. Id. at 629.
20011 GENDER DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PREGNANT LITIGATORS 171
A few other secondary suggestions may help eliminate the
problem in gradual steps. For instance, any written literature that
is produced from the court, including decisions and correspondence,
should be reviewed and monitored to ensure that gender-neutral
language and thoughts are used. Judges should be informed when
they have produced documentation that does not meet this require-
ment. To be done effectively, this operation would also need a neutral
review system or board that would use a pre-determined set of criteria
in making these judgments and recommendations. The criteria should
be made available to judges and attorneys so as to aid their
compliance. Jurisdictions would need to set up guidelines for this
suggestion so as to ensure and maintain the confidentiality of any
litigation documents.
Another possibility would be for firms and government offices
to create programs or opportunities for younger attorneys to have
contact with the more experienced attorneys in a mentor fashion.
Women could learn from older attorneys the ways to deal with
discrimination both from judges and from male attorneys during
courtroom interactions. Female mentors could also make younger
attorneys aware of the proper methods to lodge complaints and inform
them of any other avenues that are available to air grievances. In
exchange the newer attorneys would be able to keep the more
established female attorneys informed of the discrimination that still
exists even if they did not inform the mentors. This system would
also help women litigators generally understand that their experiences
are not isolated and give women a chance to discuss their problems
first to determine if a formal actual need to be taken.
CONCLUSION
Outright discrimination against pregnant women in employment
practices is not addressed and prohibited by the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act that was passed in 1978 as a response to the Supreme
Court decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.3 ' The Court had
said pregnancy did not constitute sex-based discrimination and
Congress responded by saying the opposite.13 ' Future cases used the
act to extend protection to the spouses of male employees 132 and the
130. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
131. See id. at 125.
132. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
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female employees who were kept away from certain factory jobs on
the chance that they may become pregnant. 13
- Gender discrimination does still exist in the legal profession.
Surveys done in different jurisdictions report that women still feel
they are treated differently than their male counterparts by judges
and by opposing counsel."3 4 Women are often placed in a difficult
position based on this discrimination because if they try to avoid the
generalized female stereotypes so as to not offend judges, they may
risk failing to properly serve their clients.
There is also evidence, however, that for the most part the
discrimination that is still felt by women in the legal field is subtle
and waning. Women report more derogatory comments, looks, and
acts from judges and male attorneys as opposed to blatant offensive
statements or adverse employment actions. There are also reports
from the surveys cited that in some areas women do not feel
discriminated against at all, and are encouraged that the trend seems
to be towards acceptance of women in the field. 35 However, these
subtle types of discrimination are still damaging and they cannot be
properly addressed by the protective legislation in the area because
they do not result in overt adverse employment actions.Overt discrimination remains against pregnant female litigators.
Females report incidents of overt discrimination in the courtroom
setting despite the fact that the trend in the legal system appears
to be towards subtle discrimination, if any at all. 131 Male judges and
attorneys were reported to make highly offensive comments to
pregnant litigators in open court. 37 Women litigators also reported
being assigned to lesser cases when they were pregnant. This
discrepancy between the treatment of women as legal professionals
and soon-to-be mothers comes from the dual roles that women are
placed in within society. When some men are confronted with the
physical manifestations of a woman's gender they place her in the
female-motherhood role. The discrimination results when the woman
places herself back in the professional role through litigating in a
courtroom. Again, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not address
these comments; however, it does contain a remedy for women who
suffer adverse employment decisions because of their pregnancy."S
133. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187
(1991).
134. See supra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 72-91 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
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The difficulty is in proving that the action was a result of bias against
the woman based on her pregnancy.
There are several remedies that can be integrated into the legal
system to address the areas of discrimination that the protective
legislation cannot reach. First, a proper review system should be
implemented in firms to ensure that assignments are given to female
litigators without discrimination, although this would have little effect
in the courtroom itself. Second, task forces should be created to
investigate gender bias in particular jurisdictions and publish the
findings. Another effective alternative is to encourage female lawyers,
and particularly litigators, to file formal complaints. A key element
of this complaint system is anonymity of the proceedings. Also,
education about ways to deal with and avoid discrimination should
begin in law school because the majority of lawyers are required to
attend and graduate from a law school. Similarly, training ofjudges
should include ways to avoid perpetuating discrimination themselves,
as well as ways to deal with the discrimination when it is manifested
from other players in the courtroom. All correspondence and decisions
from the courthouse should be reviewed to ensure gender-neutral
conduct. Finally, firms and government offices should implement
mentor systems to help younger female attorneys deal with
discrimination.
All of the above suggestions are just a start, a way forjurisdictions
to recognize that certain types of discrimination still exist, and to send
a message that they will not be tolerated. It is encouraging that
studies show a reduction in discrimination, particularly overt
discrimination, and this trend should be applauded. However, the
legal system must not discontinue its efforts to ensure equality for
those who participate in the adversarial process until that goal is
reached for every person - man or woman.
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